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Abstract 
The field of International Political Economy offers valuable insights into global economic integration, trade 
liberalisation, global governance, and the nature and activities of international organisations and regimes. Despite 
their impact on industrial relations, Industrial Relations theory has not wholeheartedly engaged with these 
phenomena or this sister field.  This paper argues that the field of International Political Economy offers much to 
Industrial Relations, particularly in terms of understanding the nature and impact of internationalisation and 
emerging global governance. The potential in a closer relationship between the two fields is illustrated by the 
example of the international labour standards regime and its principal organisation, the International Labour 
Organisation. 
 
Introduction  
A closer relationship between Industrial Relations (IR) and the field of International Political 
Economy (IPE) is desirable. IR’s growing interest in international issues will, we suggest, benefit 
greatly from this relationship, as illustrated by a case study of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and its international labour standards regime (ILSR). Within IPE, the 
concept of an ILSR is closely linked to the debate around nascent global governance, understood 
as “the intensification of global political, economic and social interaction (which) has generated 
pressures for a concomitant system of governance” (Wilkinson 2002: 2-3). These are concepts 
operating at a macro level par excellence, at first appearing to be distant from many traditional 
industrial relations issues. However, progress towards global governance has important 
implications for the study and practice of IR.  IPE provides ways of understanding those 
implications. We believe that IPE also contributes to IR’s established interest in the impacts of, 
for example, economic internationalisation (including the role of the transnational corporation, 
supra-national regionalism, and the international trade regime (embodied in the World Trade 
Organisation – WTO).  The chosen case study is one example in which IR and IPE come 
together. In our conclusion, we suggest other research topics in which the fields of IR and IPE 
might be integrated. 
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I Industrial Relations and the International 
The international has only recently become a mainstream feature of IR analysis. Previously, IR 
focused on national systems and their internal operation, a focus revealed not only in the 
founding texts of the field (for example, in the case of the UK and the US, the Webbs 1897; 
Clegg and Flanders 1954; Commons 1924), but also in IR practice, which traditionally has been 
bound up in the operation of national IR systems. Understandably, IR scholarship did not place 
great emphasis on the international.  However, this picture needs to be qualified in two ways. The 
international was never entirely absent from IR and, in recent years, it has gained substantial 
ground. 
 
Historically, the international was addressed in a number of ways. First, the comparative 
method, wherein national IR systems are compared and contrasted, has been long established. 
For example, it is an important theme in Dunlop’s 1958 classic text, Industrial Relations Systems. 
The comparative approach remains an important methodological tradition in IR today (for 
example, Katz and Darbishire 2000; Locke et. al. 1995: Ferner and Hyman 1998). Second, the 
comparative approach contributed to important international political outcomes in the 
reconstruction of IR systems after the Second World War. For example, the renovation of the 
German and Japanese bargaining systems was driven by the larger political objective to establish 
pluralist political traditions in those countries (for example, Gordon 1998; Thelen 1992). Third, 
the ILO and its activities since 1919 have given rise to studies of the organisation and its impact 
on international bargaining (for example, Ghebali 1989; Galenson 1981; Alcock 1971; Johnston 
1970).  Fourth, the rise of international trade unions has attracted attention, as have the prospects 
for international bargaining as a result of international labour organisation (for example, Levinson 
1972; Olle and Schoeller 1977; Spalding 1977). Fifth, the rise and fall of colonial regimes 
produced considerable interest in the IR systems introduced into colonies, and in the impact on 
those systems of decolonisation (for example, Busch 1983; Webb 1957). 
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Today, IR analysis has shifted gear in terms of the international. Contemporary IR 
interest in international issues primarily addresses post-Second World War international 
economic and political integration. The comparative method remains important. However, IR 
analysis now recognises that supra-national institutions such as the European Union (EU), the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation 
(APEC) have institutional interests that seek to shape the operation of IR systems within their 
spheres of influence. Moreover, the recognition of these interests provides an important bridge 
between IR and IPE (for example,. for Europe, Da Costa 1999; Ferner and Hyman 1998; Jensen 
et al 1995; Leonard 2001; Pochet 1998; Streeck 1995 and 1998; Thirkell et al 1995; for APEC, 
Haworth and Hughes 2002; 2000b; for NAFTA, Compa 2001). 
 
Contemporary IR also now looks closely at the IR impacts of transnational corporations 
and the creation of international patterns of employment relations (for example, Edwards 2000, 
Marginson and Sisson 2002a and b).  This focus ties in with growing interest in the structure and 
performance of international trade union organisations and the development of new forms of 
worker involvement in transnational; corporations Equally, the analysis of international patterns 
of employment relations has much in common with the current debate around international 
labour standards and a social clause attached to international trade agreements (Haworth and 
Hughes 2000a).  
 
There is also much contemporary interest in the systems that have developed in some of 
the Newly Industrialised Countries (see for example, Deyo 1989; Deyo et al (eds.) 2001; Koo 
1993). In considering the IR systems of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and other Asian growth poles, 
we have also seen the creation of tailor-made IR systems predicated on the successful integration 
of national economies into the global trade regime. They can be contrasted with Western 
European IR systems in the sense that the former are systems constructed in the knowledge of 
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and in sympathy with the internationalisation process, whilst the latter are systems forged in 
different historical contexts now seeking to find a modus vivendi in an increasingly open and 
integrated international economy. A similar argument may be made for the Eastern European 
economies undergoing market liberalisation (for example, Frege 1999). 
 
The field of IR is today far more aware of the impacts of international institutions and 
processes. Above all, the impact of economic internationalisation and supranational regional 
integration has created this awareness. IR is, we believe, now more open to involvement with 
other fields that focus on the international and is well positioned to draw on IPE’s insights.  
 
II Global Governance, Regime Formation and Embedded Liberalism 
In this section, we leave IR and, after a brief note on IPE’s origins, turn to three concepts 
developed in IPE – global governance, international regimes and embedded liberalism. To 
summarise what follows, debates in IPE have posited the emergence of global governance, 
located in the ideologies and practices of myriad international organisations and, for some at 
least, in a globally pervasive neo-liberal ideology. A key concept in this debate is the international 
regime – the combination of rules, norms and decision-making processes that govern 
international organisations and associated processes. Our discussion of this concept sets the 
scene for our subsequent account of one contemporary international regime – the international 
labour standards regime. 
 
The Origins of IPE 
Before the 1970s, IPE did not enjoy independent status as a field of study. Until then, the central 
focus of IPE – the interaction between domestic politics and the international economy - was a 
province of comparative politics. Meanwhile, International Relations addressed the high politics 
and security issues of the Cold War and the associated activities of the Superpowers. A series of 
events in the late 1960s onward – from the abandonment of the Bretton-Woods system, the Oil 
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Shocks, the rise of Japan and the Tiger Economies of SE Asia, to the spread and entrenchment 
of neo-liberalism and the activities of transnational corporations in the global trade and 
investment system – led to the questioning of analytical frameworks which isolated international 
and domestic politics from each other (Katzenstein et. al. 1998). The growth and nature of 
intergovernmental organisations, particularly their central role in the development and 
maintenance of international regimes, became a core concern of international political 
economists. In time, IPE came to focus on the activities of states, transnational corporations and 
other powerful actors seeking to advance their own interests within these international regimes 
(Gilpin. 2001). Hence, internationalisation (or, more controversially, globalisation – see, for 
example, Held et. al. 1999; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Wade 1996) served to underline the fusion 
of national and international interests and the significance of this fusion as an explanatory 
variable in the international political economy. It is in the context of the spread and deepening of 
internationalisation that IPE has come into its own as a field of study. 
 
Global Governance 
IPE’s realist orthodoxy understands world, or global, politics in terms of the role and nature of 
the nation state (Wilkinson 2002). The modern nation state acts with other nation states to 
construct sets of relationships, some collaborative, some conflictual, some requiring the 
establishment of formal international agencies, others not. In this view, to the extent that global 
governance exists, it is a reflection of the global balance of power that binds nation states 
together. The idea of global governance becoming more than the sum of nation states is 
unpalatable to the realist IPE tradition. An alternative school – the liberal institutionalists - 
accepts the importance of nation states in international affairs but moves away from the realist 
position to the extent that it believes that international institutions, in their own right and under 
certain conditions, have a significant impact on global institutional arrangements.  
There is, however, a further view within IPE that extends the liberal institutionalist 
position through the study of international organisations. It initially focuses on the activities of 
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two international bodies – the League of Nations and the ILO – and goes on to look at similar 
international institutions that were formed after the Second World War. This tradition advances 
the idea of global governance. It points to two distinguishing features that define contemporary 
global governance – the array of institutions and actors now operating on the global stage, and 
the extent to which these actors and institutions are now able to order and manage (that is, 
govern) issues globally. In this view, global governance comprises a growing complexity in the 
way international actors interact and interrelate in the management of political, economic and 
social affairs. The key to understanding these processes is the capacity to identify the range of 
actors involved and to uncover the variety of ways in which they are connected to one another. 
In this regard it is better developed in some areas such as economic global governance, than 
others such as environment and human rights (Wilkinson, 2000: 2 -3). It is very much in 
formation and will suffer setbacks and obstacles.  However, the global governance perspective 
suggests that, in time and as a result of pressures for economic and political integration, the 
legitimacy, autonomy and reach of international organisations will grow.  
 
The global governance perspective is subject to criticism on two major fronts (Murphy 
2002). First, following Cox (1996a), it is ‘a cloud of ideological influences that has fostered the 
realignment of elite thinking to the needs of the world market’ (Murphy 2002: xi). Critics point to 
the importance of neo-liberal thinking in many international institutions, and a concomitant 
capacity in international institutions to create a unity of purpose around the neo-liberal model. In 
this view, global governance can be reduced to an array of powerful intergovernmental 
institutions that share common perspectives on economic management and market outcomes. 
The criticism begs two questions: first, to what extent is this powerful institutional unity 
contested? Second, is the dominance of international institutions by neo-liberal traditions 
inevitable?  
 
 7 
Second, there is the issue of the autonomy of international institutions. To what extent 
are they able to transcend the wishes of their constituent nation states and, more importantly, the 
interests of a hegemonic power that seeks to protect and sustain a world order in its own image? 
This question can be answered empirically as there is much experience of international 
organisations since the Second World War upon which to base a judgement. Institutional politics 
proposes one interpretation of the evidence (Murphy 2002: xi). This suggests that international 
bureaucracies are, by dint of their control of information and resources, able to take mandates, 
develop them beyond the brief originally imposed by constituent member states, and feed them 
back into the decision-making process for ratification. This autonomy feeds further autonomous 
development. This is plausible. Mandates given in international organisations are frequently 
couched in general terms, or in terms of principles. The officials of the organisations are required 
to give life to those mandates and, consequently, what might be called ‘mandate creep’ is 
possible. Similarly, active leadership of international organisations – such as that displayed by 
Moore when at the WTO and Somavia in the ILO – is able to carve out a degree of institutional 
autonomy for individual and institution.  
 
The issue of hegemonic power is more challenging. Some perceive global governance as 
an expression of the power and preference of the United States (Gilpin 2000). Currently, for 
example, the United States is unwilling to adhere to the Kyoto agreements relating to climate 
change. It is frequently suggested that this encourages other nations to take a similar view, thus 
fundamentally undermining the reach of the agreement. How can Kyoto work when the world’s 
biggest energy consuming nation will not abide by its requirements? The answer to this type of 
challenge may lie in the effects of regionalisation. For example, the US has been unable to impose 
its will on the WTO because of powerful forces in the EU, Asia and the influential bloc of 
developing economies prepared to present alternative views on issues such as agriculture, 
intellectual property issues and trade in services. The failure of the Seattle meeting of the WTO 
was in part an effect of the developing world refusing en masse to accept outcomes demanded by 
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the developed world. Thus, regionalisation and bloc formation may provide at least a partial 
antidote to hegemonic excess. 
 
International Regimes and Regime Formation 
The concept of an international regime grew out of a concern in IPE that it had developed 
sophisticated analyses of international organisations, but had not addressed effectively the issue 
of international governance.  An influential definition characterises regimes as ‘implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.’ (Krasner 1982: 186) 
 
Examples of international regimes that have attracted attention in IPE are the Cold War, 
the GATT/WTO trade regime, the EU, NATO, and the ILO. They conform to the definition 
offered by Krasner and adopt institutional forms that bring nation states together in line with the 
norms, principles, rules that are particular to a regime. Regimes are, in this sense, the building 
blocks of global governance. 
 
How regimes operate is hotly debated. Keohane, for example, is unwilling to grant 
effective autonomy to institutions operating in an international regime. Rather, he sees regimes as 
a means to establish mutual expectations and effective working relationships between nation 
states on the basis of transparency and, presumably, trust (Keohane 1984). Kratochwil and 
Ruggie (1986) share some of Keohane’s views, but also emphasise what they call the ‘epistemic 
dimension’ of regimes. They argue that the accumulation and comprehension of knowledge in 
the international arena are neither passive nor automatic processes but intensely political. In this 
respect, international organisations ‘manoeuvre’ themselves into the position of being the vehicle 
through which knowledge about international agendas emerges, and from which the future 
demand for international regimes is driven. Their argument recognises that international 
organisations promote regime formation and change by means of the information and ideas that 
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they mobilise. It follows that a most important function of regimes is the collection and 
dissemination of knowledge. International organisations operating in regimes become the 
gatekeepers of knowledge about many areas of global activity. Control and use of knowledge 
delivers autonomy from constituent nation states. Other commentators reflect on the epistemic 
dimension, in particular Cox (1973), who, having spent twenty-five years at the ILO, argues that 
its survival is due to a significant extent to the activities of its executive leaders. He dubs them a 
‘limited monarchy’, which has used knowledge and the politics of the possible to protect and 
sustain ILO activities. 
 
Regime change 
Regimes undergo continuous transformations in response to their own internal dynamics (Young 
1982, p.290), the activities of institutional leadership and knowledge-based experts, as well as 
their political, economic and social environments (Young 1991; Haas 1992). For example, Asia’s 
regional financial turmoil in July 1997 resulted in crises for a number of global regimes – trade, 
financial and social, in particular. Policy responses by the international agencies addressed both 
the social impact of the crisis on national economies and the global challenges thrown up by the 
crisis. Regimes did not respond in a uniform manner, but their different emphases established a 
global interplay between prescriptions. The prescriptions of the ILO were, at least initially, at 
odds with those of the international financial institutions (IFIs), with the former stressing the 
importance of balance between financial and social responses. Eventually, the IFIs came much 
closer to the ILO perspective as the potential for long-term social instability in the Asian region 
became clearer. All regimes involved in the crisis shifted ground as a result of internal re-
assessment and external relations with other regimes and their institutions. 
According to Young, three processes can lead to the transformation of regimes (1982: 
291-294). First, some regimes develop internal contradictions, which lead to failure or a demand 
for major change. These take the form of potentially irreconcilable conflicts between important 
elements of the regime’s activities or institutions. Sometimes, the internal contradictions may 
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drive developments, which become embedded over time and rejuvenate the regime. On other 
occasions, crisis may lead to regime failure. Second, transformation also arises from shifts in the 
underlying structure of power in the international system. Order is unlikely to survive major 
decline in the power of the dominant actor or actors. Regimes often depend for existence on an 
underlying political dynamic, which draws energy from dominant or competing interests. The 
Cold War illustrates the point.  The Cold War – an international security regime - collapsed when 
the power relations that underpinned its existence skewed dramatically. Of course, this was an 
example of an unusually abrupt change. Often, shifts in the distribution of power within a regime 
will often occur more gradually. A third type of transformation occurs when regimes fall victim 
to exogenous forces. These reflect societal developments beyond a regime’s boundaries but 
powerful enough to threaten the regime’s foundations. A contemporary example of this effect is 
the impact of communication technology on the capacity of civil society to share and use 
information. NGOs have made particularly effective use of this technology in developing 
opposition to the international trade and investment regime, established in the WTO, the OECD 
and other international agencies.  
 
Regimes: a critique 
The concept of regimes is not universally accepted in IPE. For example, Strange describes the 
notion as ‘… a passing fad…imprecise and woolly… that limits vision of a wider reality’ (Strange 
1997: 4). Stein suggests that it is little more than a ‘synonym for international organisations’ (Stein 
1982: 299). For these critics, the concept of regimes has developed into a catch-all that embraces 
everything from a patterned set of interactions - an international system, any form of multilateral 
co-ordination, co-operation or collaboration – to an umbrella for all international relations. 
Donnelly (1986) thinks much of this criticism is off the mark because it attributes far too high a 
theoretical status to the regime concept. Rather than an attempt at ‘grand theory’, the regime 
concept should be seen as a pragmatic approach to understanding the contexts in which 
international organisations work. Seen in this functional way, the concept is useful as an ordering 
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mechanism or as a metaphor for those international environments in which principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures have a significant impact on outcomes and behaviour 
(Krasner 1982) 
 
Embedded Liberalism 
With the notions of global governance and regime in place, we can now turn to a suggestive 
analysis of the link between IPE and IR. Of particular importance is Ruggie’s understanding of 
embedded liberalism – in particular, its origins and nature (Ruggie 1982). In brief, embedded 
liberalism arose as an effect of the post Second World War settlement. That settlement included 
strong pressure for a US dollar-based international economic system, founded on the elimination 
of discriminatory trade practices. Multilateralism – a system of co-ordinating relations between 
three or more economies in accordance with agreed principles of conduct - became a guiding 
principle in international relations (particularly in trade), and was reflected in the configuration 
and behaviour of post-war international institutions. Under pressure from the hegemon (the US) 
international relationships (regimes) were transformed. The commitment of American business 
to the tariff-lowering General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) required an implicit 
compact with the US administration: the open door at home would be compensated by the open 
door abroad (Maier 1977).  
 
The role of the hegemon was, of course, contested and the new order was forced to 
make accommodations. In particular, concerns grew about the domestic impacts of international 
liberalisation and a concomitant growth in international social relations, which connected the 
social classes of different countries (Cox 1996b). The new economic order came, therefore, to 
underwrite the expansion of the international trade agenda through the construction of domestic 
safeguards. In exchange for society accepting change and dislocation arising from trade 
liberalisation, the state promised to cushion these effects by means of a more interventionist role 
in economic and social policy. The arrangement – termed the ‘embedded liberalism compromise’ 
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by Ruggie – was multilateral in character and predicated on domestic intervention ‘reflecting the 
shared legitimacy of a set of social objectives to which the industrial world had moved, unevenly 
but “as a single entity” (Ruggie 1982: 398).  
 
From an industrial relations perspective, this interventionism was legitimised by a 
pluralist orthodoxy given life by Dunlop, Kerr and the ILO and built upon domestically by 
national research clusters such as the Oxford School in the United Kingdom. The late 1950s saw 
the articulation of a particular American doctrine of industrial relations that was accorded ‘pride 
of place in the ILO as the rationale for its programs’ (Cox 1996c). This doctrine stressed a co-
operative approach to problem solving, the institutionalisation of conflict, plus an increased role 
for social psychology and communication in IR. The key to the approach lay in the construction 
of a system of institutional governance, inhabited by peak employer bodies, labour interests and 
state representation, the latter seeking to manoeuvre proceedings toward some form of 
consensus on policy. Significant in the spread of the pluralist orthodoxy was the influence of US-
based funding bodies such as the Carnegie and Ford Foundations. They helped to shape 
outcomes by funding research, which sought to embed and legitimise the liberal compromise. 
Kerr et. al.’s Industrial Man (1960) was funded by the Ford Foundation and evolved from a series 
of consultations and conferences at the ILO during the 1950s. Dunlop’s Industrial Relations Systems 
(1958) was written during sabbatical leave in Geneva. Both were products of their time in terms 
of intellectual orientation and owe a common debt to the ILO tradition (Cox 1996c). 
 
Two key points follow from this. First, from an IPE perspective, Dunlopian systems 
thinking and Oxford School pluralism might be seen as significant components of embedded 
liberalism’s domestic intervention in economic and social policy. The new multilateralism and 
embedded liberalism depended significantly upon the domestic accommodations at the heart of 
pluralist IR orthodoxy. Second, the linking of the new multilateralist order with domestic 
intervention established a connection between domestic interest groups and the international 
 13 
order. As interdependence grew between domestic and international contexts, domestic groups 
came to have international regime interests. Those interests were reflected in concern about the 
nature of the multilateral system and in the implications of an international consensus (at least, in 
the OECD type economies) for domestic policy settings. To this extent, the notion of 
convergence may be usefully applied to the consensus within industrialised economies around 
domestic stability in a multilateral world. Countries did not necessarily share common views 
about the form or depth of measures to promote domestic stability, but they shared a view about 
the desired end (Ruggie 1982). Domestic interest in the structure and operation of national IR 
systems became actively engaged with the changing multilateral order, in particular with the ILO 
and its associated regime. In this section, we have discussed the related concepts of global 
governance, regime and embedded liberalism. The complex of international regimes in place at 
any given time constitutes the extent of global governance. The ILO is at the heart of one such 
regime. ‘Regime interests’ have been promoted at the domestic level as a result of the search for 
domestic stability in a multilateralist international environment. Regime interests underpin the 
contemporary engagement of domestic interests with international regimes.  
 
III The ILO: the formation of an international labour standards regime 
We now turn to a case study of an international regime in operation - the ILO’s international 
labour standards regime (ILSR). We do so for two reasons. First, the longevity of the ILO as an 
international organisation makes it a particularly important example of an international regime. 
Second, the ILSR highlights the importance of both domestic and international influences on the 
functioning of international organisations and the development of international regimes.  
 
Our thesis is that the ILO has since 1919 created and sustained an ILSR, frequently 
against great odds. Moreover, the ILO - the institutional form of the ILSR - has been revitalised 
in recent years as a result of growing concerns about inequality, social protection, the social 
dimension of trade, human rights and the consequences of restructuring. The ILO is now central 
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to the development of alternatives to the international financial and trade regimes and is, 
therefore, a leading player in contemporary global governance. For ILO Director General Juan 
Somavia, this gives new global relevance to ILO activities in the international community. It is 
the global reference point for knowledge on employment and labour issues, the centre for 
normative action in the world of work, a platform for international debate and negotiation on 
social policy, and a source of services for advocacy, information and policy formulation (Somavia 
1999). 
The principal ideas underpinning the creation of the ILO echo Krasner’s definition of a 
regime. These include the principle of social justice, norms requiring ILO members to recognise 
and protect the rights of labour, rules requiring the ratification of international labour standards 
and a tripartite decision-making process. Thus, in 1919, the ILO was an embryonic international 
regime based on principles of labour protection and the implementation of labour standards, but 
the power to ratify and execute labour protection and standards rested firmly with national 
governments. Initially, the ILO’s institutional autonomy was weak. Moreover, there was no clear 
inter-governmental strategy for the ILO’s development (Haas 1964). Into this vacuum stepped 
the first Director of the ILO, Albert Thomas, who, in line with Cox’s analysis of limited 
monarchy (Cox 1973), began the process of executive definition of regime formation.  
Thomas’ approach was based on three substantive strategies (Hughes 1999). The first 
was a strategy of autonomy. Thomas recognised that the League of Nations was moribund and 
sought to create an independent identity for the ILO. This required other ingredients – the active 
support of labour and a far larger involvement in the ILO of countries from outside Europe. 
Both were achieved by conscious interventions designed to create an active international 
involvement in the work of the ILO. Central to this activity were the tripartite international 
labour conferences, which Thomas argued were the life-blood of the ILO. Second, there was a 
strategy of presence. Thomas and his successor, Harold Butler, sought to link the work of the 
ILO with social reformers and unions at the national level, creating a strong functional bond 
between the international organization and national politics. The ILO became useful, primarily in 
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terms of the provision of knowledge, the so-called epistemic dimension of regimes (Kratochwil 
and Ruggie 1986). It was competence in this area that helped to convince the US to join the ILO 
in 1934 as its trade position eroded and the ILO became the leading forum for brokering an 
international solution to the world depression of the time (Alcock 1971). Third, there was a 
strategy of relevance. Both Thomas and Butler employed what has been called ‘a conscious 
strategy of leadership’ (Cox 1992) in seeking to make the ILO’s tripartism a forum for change 
and a platform on which worker interests could be articulated internationally. In this, they acted 
in accord with Cox’s analysis of the role of leaders in defining the effective functioning of 
international organizations (Cox 1973). 
A significant feature of the ILO’s development was its capacity to combine its 
international agenda with domestic interests. This was achieved on the basis of information 
flows, technical assistance and an explicit programme to make the ILO relevant to a broad range 
of countries. In line with other analyses of regime formation, domestic factors such as public 
opinion and interest mobilisation become critical considerations in the creation of inter-
governmental activity. (Hughes 1999)   
Thus, the period between formation in 1919 and the end of the Second World War was 
broadly successful for the ILO and its ILSR. The post-war period was more difficult. Unlike the 
inter-war years, they were marked by competing hegemons – the US and Soviet Union.  The ILO 
was buffeted as the union movement splintered on the basis of competing Cold War allegiances. 
Ratification of conventions fell away. The usefulness of the ILO was widely questioned and for 
two years from 1970, the US withdrew its funds from the ILO. For many, the ILO became an 
irrelevance, detached from the lives of ordinary workers, and dominated by the imperatives of 
the Cold War (Hughes 2002).  
From 1994 a combination of four factors served to revitalise ILO activity - the end of 
the Cold War, the reactivation of international concern about social protection (particularly social 
safety nets and the more general area of human security), the role of two powerful Director 
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Generals (Michael Hansenne and Juan Somavia), and, possibly most importantly, the debate 
about linkages between trade and labour standards thrown up by the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round. Under Somavia, the ILO moved forward on four key fronts. First, he drove the new 
“Decent Work” strategy. This combines employment issues, rights, social protection and social 
dialogue around development strategies. It is in many ways the reassertion of the original purpose 
of the ILO, earlier captured in the Declaration of Philadelphia. Second, Somavia is seeking to 
strengthen tripartism and collective action in the ILO. The intention is to build the political will 
amongst the ILO social partners to strengthen the Decent Work campaign and other ILO 
activities. Third, the ILO is being reformed and modernised, not without some pain. New 
structures and positions have been created. External appointments have been made. The reform 
and modernisation programme targets many of the inefficiencies in the ILO’s operations. Finally, 
closer alliances with other international and intergovernmental agencies are being promoted. The 
ILSR is co-operating vigorously with other international regimes in the search for global social 
justice.  
Underpinning all four factors is a strategic vision seeking to capitalise on four major 
assumptions. First, Somavia’s ILO articulates a need for a more inclusive system of global 
governance, which recognises that successful markets are embedded in broader frameworks of 
shared social values. Second, the onus is placed on governments to build a new consensus about 
the conditions that foster successful markets. The ILO – tripartite, independent, unfettered by 
Cold War divisions – has assumed the role of the international forum in which such a consensus 
may be built. Third, it is also the forum in which the required coincidence of domestic and 
international interests around issues such as globalisation, human security, transparency and 
social justice can be achieved, Finally, it is a forum in which the pressures from broader civil 
society, especially the NGOs, can be met constructively. 
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This portrait of the ILO will seem to many to be overly optimistic. For example, its 
attempt to address internationalisation and the restructuring of work through new programmes 
of action has attracted criticism. Vosko argues that while the ‘Decent Work’ initiative affords 
greater voice to informal labour, NGOs and women’s groups, it would be an exaggeration to 
suggest that it challenges the established corporatist power relationships within the ILO (Vosko 
2002). Similarly, an empirical examination of the ILO labour standards monitoring system 
identified a cohort of ‘pariahs’ who consistently undermine monitoring effectiveness and regime 
legitimacy (Weisband 2000). More generally, the defeat of the Social Clause on trade-labour 
standards links, and the marginalisation of labour standards at the Doha meeting of the WTO, 
might suggest that the ILO’s revitalisation is more makeover than substance. 
We suggest that this is a question of vantage point. Effective influence is in many ways 
easier to exert and measure in domestic national environments. Political and institutional 
processes permit more direct influence on the levers of power. Taking this domestic experience 
and using it as a measure of the success of organizations such as the ILO will necessarily 
emphasise the difficulties faced by the ILO in achieving unqualified positive outcomes. However, 
the comparison is flawed. Comparing like with like, the ILO and the ILSR are, relative to other 
international organizations and regimes, successful. That success can be measured in terms of 
longevity, adaptability, political astuteness and maintenance of focus. Despite established 
criticism by those that demand that the ILO should have more “teeth”, its regulatory system still 
remains the prototypical model for all multilateral monitoring regimes (Weisband 2000). 
Domestic demand, changing perceptions of the articulation of state-interest and international 
organisational pressure can and do combine to influence states toward greater international co-
operation (Kent 1997). The ILO’s tripartite structure of governance provides an important 
avenue for national trade union bodies to engage in international debate with governments and 
national employer peak bodies. This avenue complements the regional activities of international 
trade union bodies such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). 
Arguably, in terms of the contemporary mechanisms of global governance, the ILO performs 
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commendably. The current revitalisation process emphasises improved performance in an 
environment in which economic and political integration gives rise to expanded opportunity for 
global governance. 
 
The ILO and its associated regime are key aspects of contemporary global governance. 
The activities of the ILO require tripartite support, and this continues to require national 
commitment to the ILO convention model. However, the ILO also acts autonomously on the 
global stage in terms of its epistemic role, in terms of the role played by its ‘limited monarchy’, 
and in its capacity to reflect a growing coincidence of domestic and international interest in the 
relationship between effective markets and social frameworks. The ILO is contemporary global 
governance in operation. 
 
IV On regimes and the ILSR 
The association of IPE with IR reveals international dimensions of job regulation that are 
currently understated in IR. To summarise the discussion, influential international organisations 
have emerged, particularly since 1945. They act within systems of international governance 
defined as regimes. Institutions are able to act in regimes because they have created degrees of 
autonomy from the interests of their constituent nation states. One significant tradition in IPE 
believes that regime-based international governance is tending towards a system of global 
governance. The ILO is the quintessential international organisation, operating within an 
international regime, the ILSR. The ILSR combines job regulation issues with a far broader 
agenda for social protection, social justice and civil society participation in international 
governance. Tripartism underpins that broader agenda.  As a result of two processes in particular 
– the ILO’s capacity to uphold the ILSR and the effects of embedded liberalism – the ILSR is 
deeply rooted in the domestic IR arrangements of nations states, be they members or not of the 
ILO.  
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From an IR perspective, two conclusions appear reasonable. First, when considering the 
implications of internationalisation for national IR systems, IR analysis of the role of supra- 
national institutions (European Union, North American Free Trade Agreement , Asia Pacific 
Economic Co-operation, for example) and transnational corporations can be complemented by 
analysis of the ILSR. The account of the ILO offered above establishes that the impacts of 
internationalisation on national IR systems are substantially mediated by the intervention of the 
ILSR. Second, IPE offers new insights into the connections between international regimes and, 
in particular, the relationship between the ILSR and other regimes (financial, trade, for example). 
This offers to IR improved understanding of how internationalisation is translated into IR 
outcomes, both domestically and supra-nationally. For example, the ILSR may be seen as 
qualifying the effects of the WTO’s trade regime and the IFIs’ financial governance models by its 
championing of a social justice agenda in inter-regime debate.  
 
V The integration of IR and IPE and future research issues 
Future research across the boundaries of IR and IPE is possible in a number of directions. There 
is ample opportunity for further conceptual work on the implications of internationalisation for 
national IR systems and the linkages between national systems. For example, Cox’s seminal work 
in IPE on the implications of internationalisation for labour has still to be drawn fully into IR 
thinking. The neo-Gramscian tradition at the heart of Cox’s and other IPE analyses is also a 
powerful tool for understanding contemporary social movements, particularly the international 
trade union movement. IPE’s discussion of the ‘epistemic’ in international organisations and 
regimes offers a valuable insight into the internationalisation of IR practices. The ILO regime 
merits further research, especially on its recent development and impact under Director Generals 
Hansenne and Somavia. Again, Cox provides helpful insights into the operation of the ILO and 
the ILSR upon which further research might be based. The tripartite system within the ILO, and 
the translation of its activities into national IR systems, is understudied. A key area requiring 
research is the assessment of the impact of ILO and the ILSR on member (and non-member) 
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economies. We know too little about the impact of the ILO activities on nation states by means 
of conventions and core labour standards. Equally, we should know more about the impact of 
the ILO’s technical programmes on national policy-making and on trade union and business 
strategy. The relationship between the ILO and the international trade and financial regimes has 
been highlighted by the 1997 Asian crisis and warrants more attention. IPE also suggests a 
particular focus on regional IR developments (in the EU, and in other supranational regional 
arrangements) with an emphasis on the extent to which there is a merging of national IR systems 
(by legislation, or by the behaviour of IR institutions). Further work on the potential response of 
international capital to the ILSR and the ILO is necessary. Finally, the impact of the ILO and its 
activities on decision-making in global corporates merits more attention.  
 
Much can be gained from a closer integration of IR and IPE. Both disciplines benefit 
from an exchange of concepts and methods. The exchange has begun on both sides. In IR, 
supra-national regionalism has focused attention on the relationship between national IR systems 
and regional IR initiatives. Meanwhile, IPE seeks a closer relationship with IR (Harrod and 
O’Brien 2002; Wilkinson 2002). To IR, IPE offers analyses of global political economy that 
provide a better understanding of the impacts of internationalisation and regional integration on 
IR institutions and behaviours. To IPE, IR offers a sophisticated understanding of the IR 
institutions and practices that are fundamental to capitalist production and the creation of 
domestic stability.  
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